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Introduction 
 
              ???? ??????????????? ??????? ??? ??? ????????????? ????????? ???? ??????????
partnership composed of twenty-seven European member states.1  The EU was 
originally implemented to create an economic community, whereby member 
states would become interdependent on one another.2  The hope was that this 
interdependence would discourage conflict, as war would 
become catastrophic.3  Over time, this community evolved into a supranational 
organization with not only economic objectives, but social, cultural, political, and 
international objectives as well.4  Since its formation, the European Union has 
experienced enduring success and unity,5 and has grown from six members in 
1952 to twenty-seven members, as of December 26, 2012.6  This number 
excludes one acceding country, five candidate countries, and three potential 
candidate countries.7 
              To become a member of the European Union, a country must go through 
a rigorous screening process.8  To begin the process, a European state that 
?????????? ???? ??????????? ??? ????????? ??????????? ???????? ???? ?????? ??????? ????
???????????? ?????????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ???????????? ??? ????
Council of the European ?????? ????????????9  If the Council accepts the 
application, the country then becomes a candidate country, and accession 
negotiations begin.10  However, acceptance is not automatic; for the Council to 
approve the application, the candidate country must have stable democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights and minorities, a functioning 
market economy, a government that is able to assume the obligations of 
membership and that can implement EU rules and procedures into their domestic 
                                                 
1Basic Information on the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-
information/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
2Id. 
3Id. 
4See id. 
5Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 
1, 2013). 
6Enlargement, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-27-
members/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012). 
7Check Current Status, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-
current-status/index_en.htm (last updated Dec. 18, 2012). 
8Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN UNION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm (last updated Sept. 
13, 2012). 
9Id. 
10Id. 
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laws.11  If the Council unanimously agrees that the candidate country has met 
these conditions (the "Copenhagen criteria"), accession negotiations 
will begin.12             
              To conclude the next stage, negotiations must be conducted in thirty-five 
separate chapters.13  Each of these chapters is geared towards a particular subject 
matter with the goal of aligning the candidate country's laws with those of 
the acquis communautaire: the legislation, regulations, and cases that embody 
European Union law.14  A few examples of these chapters include the free 
movement of goods and workers, education and culture, and the environment.15  
The European Commission examines each chapter to determine whether the 
candidate country is prepared for negotiations on that particular subject matter 
and recommends whether negotiations should be opened.16  Once a chapter is 
opened, negotiations are conducted with the candidate country, and the 
completion time depends on how quickly the country reforms its laws.17  Once all 
chapter negotiations are concluded and both sides are satisfied with the candidate 
country's progress, an Accession Treaty is drafted.18  This treaty must then be 
signed by all members of the European Union.19  After all member states and the 
candidate country ratify the treaty, it will enter into force, and the 
acceding country becomes a member state.20 
              Turkey is one of the five countries currently engaged in accession 
negotiations.21  Although Turkey and the European Union have experienced close 
relations since the signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which 
brought Turkey into the customs union,22 Turkey's accession 
remains immensely controversial.  The contentious nature of Turkey's accession 
largely stems from its Islamic heritage, which has caused the county 
to struggle with the separation of church and state.23  Although the Republic of 
Turkey was founded in 1923 on the notion that the state would be 
secular,24 the country has difficulty upholding this principle, as ninety-nine 
percent of the population is Muslim.25  Furthermore, there has been increasing 
                                                 
11Id. 
12Steps Towards Joining, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/steps-towards-
joining/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2012). 
13Conditions for Membership, EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 8. 
14Id. 
15Id. Other elements of the acquis communautaire include intellectual property law, agriculture, 
taxation, social policy and employment, and external relations. 
16Steps Towards Joining, supra note 12. 
17Id. 
18Id. 
19Id. 
20Id. 
21Countries, supra note 5. 
22Turkey, EUROPEAN UNION, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/turkey/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2012). 
23See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 30-32. 
24Id. ¶ 30; T???????C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 2 (Turk.). 
25Turkey, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/candidate-
countries/turkey/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). 
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public support for political parties that back theocratic governance,26 or 
alternatively, a plurality of legal systems categorizing individuals based on their 
religious beliefs.27  Given the overwhelmingly Muslim population and increased 
public support for alternative forms of governance, many individuals are 
concerned that Turkey will not fit in with the predominantly Christian Europe.28  
Furthermore, many feel that Turkey should not be admitted into the European 
Union because it is not part of Europe, given its location as the "geographical and 
cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East."29 
              Unfortunately, due to this religious ambience, it is unlikely that Turkey 
will gain admission to the European Union in the near future.  Turkey's struggle to 
lessen religious influence has resulted in a history of governmental suppression of 
individual, civil, and political rights in order to preserve the principles of 
secularism and democracy, particularly when it comes to freedom of association 
and freedom of religion.30  For example, Turkey has dissolved political parties 
in favor of theocratic governance and has prohibited women from wearing 
headscarves on university campuses.31  The European Court of Human Rights 
???????? has occasionally upheld the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
????????????????????????????????????????????32 leading one to believe that Turkey's 
suppression of rights in favor of secularism and democracy is in conformity with 
European Union standards.  However, the ECHR has consistently condemned 
Turkey for violations of freedom of association and freedom of religion.33   
Furthermore, the European Commission 
likewise denounces Turkey's law regarding the closure of political parties and its 
failure to ensure religious freedom.34  Due to the importance of political parties 
"in view of their essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of 
                                                 
26E .g., Ran Hirschl, Symposium: Constitutional Courts in the F ield of Power Politics: 
Constitutional Courts vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1819, 1849 (2004); see also Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 2003-II  Eur. Ct. H.R. 
27See Refah Partisi, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 28. 
28See, e.g., Padideh Ala'i, Conference: Turkey: At the Crossroads of Secular West and Traditional 
East: Introduction, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 679, 680 (2009); Saying No to Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 15, 2004; NATALIE TOCCI, TURKEY'S EUROPEAN FUTURE: BEHIND THE SCENES OF AMERICA'S 
INFLUENCE ON EU-TURKEY RELATIONS 100-01 (N.Y. University Press 2011); W. COLE DURHAM, 
JR., ET AL., ISLAM, EUROPE AND EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 301 (W. Cole Durham, Jr. et al. eds., 
2012). 
29Hirschl, supra note 26, at 1848. 
30See, e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Refah Partisi, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R.; United 
Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R.; Shubra Ohri, Turkish Constitutional 
Court Bans Kurdish Political Party, Turkey's Largest Minority Group Loses its Political 
Voice, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Feb. 2, 2010), http://hrbrief.org/2010/02/turkish-constitutional-
court-bans-kurdish-political-party/. 
31See, e.g., Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Refah Partisi, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 
32See, e.g., Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R.; Refah Partisi, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 
33See, e.g., Zengin v. Turkey, App. No. 1448/04, EUR. CT. H.R. 
(2008), http://www.echr.coe.int; Democracy and Change Party v. Turkey, App. No. 39210/98, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (2005), http://www.echr.coe.int; United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 
34Commission Staff Working Paper: Turkey 2011 Progress Report, at 9, 29-31, SEC (2011) 1201 
final (Oct. 12, 2011); Commission Staff Working Document: Turkey 2010 Progress Report, at 7, 
23-25, SEC (2010) 1327 final (Nov. 9, 2010). 
N o .  1          ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?              5  
 
democracy"35 and the consensus among democratic societies of the fundamental 
importance of freedom of religion,36 it is unlikely that the European Commission 
will open, let alone close, negotiations on the "judiciary and fundamental rights" 
chapter until Turkey protects these fundamental rights.37  In addition, even if this 
chapter is eventually closed, achieving a unanimous vote in 
favor of accession will become increasingly difficult as enlargement of the 
European Union continues.38  Moreover, several member states adamantly oppose 
Turkey's accession, including two original members:  France and Germany.39 
 
I . Political Parties in Turkey 
 
A. The Law 
 
In order to become a member of the European Union, it is imperative that 
Turkey amends its laws regarding the closure of political parties.  Turkey's 
Constitution states that "[p]olitical parties are indispensable elements of 
democratic political life."40  ??????????????????Constitution goes on to renounce 
this premise by indicating that: 
 
The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political 
parties shall not be in conflict with the independence of the state, 
its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, 
the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, 
the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not 
aim to protect or establish class or group dictatorship 
or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime.41 
 
If the Constitutional Court decides that a political party "has become a centre for 
the execution 
of" the activities prohibited in Article 68, it may dissolve the party.42  A political 
party is det???????? ??? ????? ??????? ?? ??????? ???? ???? ??????????? ??? ?????
activities when members of the party carry out the actions intensively, the 
activities or views are shared by the decision-making or administrative organ of 
the party, or the activities are carried out directly by the decision-making or 
                                                 
35United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 43. 
36E .g., Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶104; JINGHAO ZHOU, CHINA'S PEACEFUL RISE IN A GLOBAL 
CONTEXT: A DOMESTIC ASPECT OF CHINA'S ROAD MAP TO DEMOCRATIZATION 165 (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2012); Freedom of Religion: Essential Principles, DEMOCRACY WEB, 
http://www.democracyweb.org/religion/principles.php (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
37See Steps Towards Joining, supra note 12. 
38Id.; Enlargement of the European Union Factsheet EUROPEAN UNION (2010), 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/publication/elarg-factsheet_en.pdf. 
39Martin Kettle, Disgracefully, Turkey's EU Accession Bid is Going Nowhere Soon, GUARDIAN, 
Oct. 28, 2010; Turkey's EU Bid on the Rocks as Tensions with Greek Cypriots Escalate, XINHUA, 
Oct. 3, 2011. 
40T???????C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 68 (Turk.). 
41Id. 
42T???????C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 69 (Turk.). 
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administrative organ.43  The Constitutional Court has successfully banned twenty-
seven political parties based on the prohibited activities listed in Article 68.44 
 
B. The Dissolution of Pro-Kurdish Political Parties 
 
1. The United Communist Party of Turkey 
 
              The Constitutional Court dissolved the United Communist Party 
??????????????????????????45  The Court held that the mere mention of the word 
"communist" in the name of a political party was enough to dissolve the party 
under Section 96(3) of Law Number 2820.46  Moreover, because the party's 
program referred to two nations, the Kurdish nation and the Turkish nation, the 
TBKP could be dissolved for violating Article 68 of the Constitution by 
encouraging separatism and seeking to dismantle the unity of the nation.47  The 
Court came to this conclusion despite several passages in the party's program 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The [United Communist Party] will strive for a peaceful, 
democratic and fair solution of the Kurdish problem, so that the 
Kurdish and Turkish Peoples may live together of their free will 
within the borders of the Turkish Republic, on the basis of equal 
rights and with a view to democratic restructuring founded on their 
common interests.48 
Based on the above passage, it appears that the program seeks a society where the 
Kurdish and 
Turkish people live together in peaceful coexistence.  Thus, the inquiry become 
whether Turkey sought to ban the party solely because of its pro-Kurdish 
program. 
              The European Commission on Human Rights ???????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects freedom of 
association.49  The Human Rights Commission began with the premise that 
dissolution constituted a violation of the parties' rights under Article 
11.50  However, Article 11 also provides that "[n]o restrictions shall be placed on 
the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and 
                                                 
43Id. 
44Ohri, supra note 30. 
45United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R. ¶ 10. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
48Id. ¶ 9. 
49Id. ¶ 17. Note that the European Commission on Human Rights has since become obsolete; the 
European Court of Human Rights was restructured so claims no longer have to go through the 
Commission before the European Court of Human Rights will hear the case- this institution will 
not appear elsewhere in this paper. The European Commission, on the other hand, is the executive 
body of the European Union and is active. 
50United Communist Party, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 36. 
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are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."51  The Human 
Rights Commission thus indicated that the dissolution was permitted under the 
Constitution and several sections of Law Number 2820 on the regulation of 
political parties.  
Next, the Human Rights Commission held that the dissolution was sought 
to pursue a legitimate aim: "the protection of ?national security.'"52  It reasoned 
that the program "could be regarded as openly pursuing the creation of a separate 
Kurdish nation and consequently a redistribution of the territory of the Turkish 
State."53  However, the Human Rights Commission concluded that the 
interference was not necessary in a democratic society as required by Article 
11.54  It stated, "there can be no democracy without pluralism;" furthermore, 
freedom of expression is enshrined in the convention not only to favorably 
received ideas, but also those that "offend, shock, or disturb."55  Thus, government 
opposition to a solution to the Kurdish problem is insufficient to 
prevent society from debating the issue in public forum. 
              The ECHR came to the same conclusion, but took a more direct route.  
The Court noted that dissolution based on a political party's name was too 
drastic a measure absent other considerations.56  Next, the Court 
considered whether the party sought to promote separatism and division of the 
Turkish nation.57  It held that the party merely sought recognition of 
the Kurds and peaceful coexistence between the Kurdish and 
Turkish peoples.58  It emphasized that an inherent characteristic of democratic 
society is the ability to resolve the nation's problems through dialogue; thus, there 
is no justification for disallowing discussion on the Kurdish problem.59  Given the 
above-cited considerations, the Court concluded that the Constitutional Court of 
Turkey violated Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights when it 
dissolved the United Communist Party.60 
 
2. The Dissolution of the Democratic Society Party 
 
              The Democratic Society Party ????????? ???????? ???-Kurdish political 
party, was banned on December 11, 2009.61  The Constitutional Court of Turkey 
accused the DTP of having connections with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, 
                                                 
51Id. ¶ 18 (emphasis added). 
52Id. ¶ 41. 
53Id. ¶ 40. 
54Id. ¶ 61. 
55Id. ¶ 43. 
56Id. ¶ 54. 
57Id. ¶ 55. 
58Id. ¶ 56. 
59Id. ¶ 57. 
60Id. ¶ 61. 
61Ohri, supra note 30. 
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a group considered a terrorist organization by the Turkish government.62  Because 
the Kurdistan Workers' Party has been fighting for Kurdish autonomy for several 
decades, the Court held that the Democratic Society Party could be 
dissolved for undermining national unity in violation of Article 68 of the 
constitution.63  This decision led to thousands of protesters taking to the streets 
because the Democratic Society Party was the only pro-Kurdish party 
recognized in the country at the time of dissolution.64 
 
3. Drawing Conclusions 
 
              Based on these cases and the Kurdish population's long-standing struggle 
to achieve equality, it appears that the Turkish government will resist all efforts to 
debate the Kurdish situation in public forum.  It is noteworthy that a large portion 
of the Kurdish population seeks a separate state through the exercise of the right 
of self-determination.65  Therefore, the government has a defendable position 
when it seeks to dissolve any pro-Kurdish political party, as Article 68 of the 
Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party if its 
program, statutes, or activities are in conflict with the indivisible integrity of the 
nation.  The government can thereby prevent pro-Kurdish parties from taking part 
in the political process by grouping all Kurdish Turks into the group that seeks to 
establish a separate state.  This conclusion is strengthened in light of numerous 
other cases where the government dissolved a pro-Kurdish political party solely 
because of the party's desire to seek a solution to the Kurdish 
problem.66  This pattern is both incomprehensible and demoralizing because 
"[w]ithout well-functioning parties, governments and legislatures have little 
chance of representing wider society in a meaningful 
way."67  Furthermore, Turkish Kurds constitute nearly twenty percent of the 
population;68 thus, by depriving one-fifth of the population of a voice, democracy 
is rendered meaningless.  In light of the government's oppression of the Kurdish 
population, it appears the size of this minority has caused the Turkish 
government to consider the group to be a significant threat to the unity of the 
nation.69 
                                                 
62Questions and Answers about the Case Against the Democratic Society Party, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Dec. 10, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/09/questions-and-answers-about-
case-against-democratic-society-party. 
63T???????C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 68 (Turk.).; Sebnem 
Arsu, Turkey Bans Kurdish Party, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009. 
64Ohri, supra note 30. 
65See, Kurds, COUNTRY STUDIES, http://countrystudies.us/turkey/28.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012). 
66See, e.g., Democracy and Change Party, EUR. CT. H.R.; Dicle on Behalf of the Democratic Party 
v. Turkey, App. No. 25141/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://www.echr.coe.int; Freedom and 
Democracy Party v. Turkey, 1999-VII EUR. CT. H.R. 
67Peter Burnell, Building Better Democracies: Why Political Parties Matter, WESTMINSTER 
FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY (Dec. 2004), www.wfd.org/upload/docs/WFDBBD5_noprice.pdf. 
68Ohri, supra note 30. 
69Kurds, supra note 65. 
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The dissolution of the United Communist Party of Turkey further supports 
the conclusion that the Turkish government will continue to dissolve parties that 
are sympathetic to the Kurdish minority.  The United Communist Party was 
formed on June 4, 1990; ten days later, the Chief Prosecutor applied to the 
Constitutional Court for an order of dissolution.70  By ordering the termination of 
a political party that had yet to participate in general elections, the 
government deprived society of the ability to debate the party's platform.  The 
ECHR agreed with this view, calling this action "disproportionate to the aim 
pursued and consequently unnecessary in a democratic society."71  It is difficult to 
fathom how a party that has yet to have any political activity could constitute a 
legitimate threat to democratic governance.  Thus, this outcome demonstrates the 
government's determination to prevent all public discussion regarding the Kurdish 
situation in light of its belief that this minority constitutes a significant threat to 
the unity of the country.  As this pattern has continued for several decades, it is 
likely that parties favoring a solution to the Kurdish situation will continue to face 
dissolution until the Constitution is amended. 
 
C . The Near-Dissolution of the Currently Ruling Party 
 
              ???? ???????? ???? ???????????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ???? ? majority 
of the 550 seats in 
Parliament.72  In the latest election in 2011, AKP won 327 seats with 49.83 
percent of the vote.73  Similarly, in the 2007 election, the party won 341 seats 
with 46.58 of the vote.74  Given the popular support this party has garnered over 
the years, it is remarkable that the party was nearly dissolved in 2008.  When the 
case involving the closure of the AKP party was brought before the Constitutional 
Court, the Court was composed of eleven judges; political parties could be 
dissolved if three-fifths of the Court voted in favor of dissolution.75  On May 7, 
2010, Turkey took one step in the right direction by amending its Constitution to 
make it more difficult to dissolve political parties.76  Article 146 now indicates 
that the Constitutional Court will be composed of seventeen members, and Article 
149 requires an affirmative vote of two-thirds to dissolve a political party.77  
Unfortunately for the AKP, its case was brought before these amendments became 
                                                 
70Olgun Akbulut, Criteria Developed by the European Court of Human Rights on the Dissolution 
of Political Parties, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 46, 48 (2010). 
71United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998-I EUR. CT. H.R. ¶ 61. 
72Background Note: Turkey, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn /3432.htm. 
73Results for Grand National Assembly of Turkey, ELECTION GUIDE, 
http://electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1628 (last updated Aug. 5, 2011). 
74Results for Grand National Assembly of Turkey, ELECTION GUIDE, 
http://electionguide.org/results.php?ID=1147 (last updated Feb. 21, 2006). 
75UPDATE: A Guide to Turkish Public Law and Legal Research, GLOBALEX, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/turkey1.htm#_Constitutional_Amendments (last visited 
Feb. 1, 2013).   
76T???????C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 146, 149 (Turk.). 
77Id. 
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effective.78  Thus, if seven out of the eleven judges voted in favor of dissolution, 
the ruling party of Turkey would be prevented from taking further political 
action.  Luckily for the AKP, it was spared by one vote: six judges voted in favor 
of dissolution.79  The Court concluded that neither the party's 
program nor statutes supported an anti-secular nation.80  Moreover, it could not be 
established that the party's objective was to destroy democracy or secularism "or 
to damage the fundamental principles of the constitutional order through the use 
of violence and intolerance."81  It will be interesting to see if these 
amendments decrease the number of parties banned in Turkey.  However, because 
there are still numerous grounds for dissolution of a political party in Article 68, it 
is likely that these amendments will spare few, if any, political parties. 
 
D . The Dissolution of Refah Partisi 
 
              ?????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ???????? ?????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ???
July 19, 1983 and dissolved fifteen years later on January 16, 1998.82  The 
Constitutional Court dissolved RP because it became a center of activities 
contrary to secularism, an indispensable attribute of democracy.83  In support of 
this conclusion, the Court looked to the conduct of several party members.  To 
start, it indicated that Refah's chairman had advocated a plurality of legal systems 
categorizing individuals based on their religious beliefs when he stated, "[t]here 
must be several legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose . . . which legal 
system is most appropriate for him . . . . In our history there have been various 
religious movements. Everyone lived according to the legal rules of his own 
organization, and so everyone lived in peace."84  The Court further noted that the 
chairman advocated a theocratic regime, instituted by force, if 
necessary.85  He made a speech where he stated, "[w]e must ask ourselves . . . 
whether this change will be violent or peaceful . . . . [W]ill it be achieved 
harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their 
?????? ??? ????? ???????86  The Court went on to analyze the conduct of several 
members of parliament.  Mr. Sevki Yilmaz called for the country to wage a 
jihad.87  In a public speech, he indicated, "[o]ur mission is not to talk, but to apply 
the war plan, as soldiers in the army."88  Finally, several other members called for 
a regime based on sharia law, advocating violence if necessary.89 
                                                 
78See Justice and Development Party, E.2008/1 (SPK), K.2008/2, TÜRK?YE CUMHUR?YET? ANAYASA 
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83Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. 
84Id. ¶ 28. 
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              After analyzing the evidence, the Court concluded that Refah's leaders 
and members were using their democratic rights and freedoms in an attempt to 
replace democratic governance with a system based on sharia law.90  It went on to 
state that "[d]emocracy is the antithesis of sharia;"91 the rules of sharia are 
incompatible with the notion of democracy, where secularism prevents the state 
from manifesting a preference for a particular religious belief.92  Consequently, 
the party was banned, the five members who caused dissolution were stripped of 
their parliamentary status, and those individuals were prohibited from 
becoming a member of another political party for five years.93 
              The ECHR was asked to decide whether the dissolution violated the 
???????????? ??????? ??? ??????? of association, as guaranteed by Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.94  In its decision, the Court stated that 
the dissolution constituted an interference with the applicants' rights.95  The Court 
further concluded that dissolution was prescribed by law;96 although anti-secular 
activities ceased to be punishable under criminal law, the Turkish 
Constitution provides that parties may be dissolved for engaging in anti-
secular conduct.97 
              The next part of the analysis required the Court to determine whether the 
dissolution 
sought to pursue a legitimate aim and whether it was necessary in a democratic 
society.98 
Without explanation, the Court indicated that dissolution sought to protect 
national security and public safety, prevent disorder and crime, and protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.99  Thus, the Court found that the government had a 
legitimate aim in dissolving RP. 
Next, in considering whether the interference was necessary, the Court 
noted that it must concentrate on three points: (1) whether the risk to democracy 
was sufficiently imminent; (2) whether the acts and speeches of the party's 
members could be imputed to the party as a whole; and (3) whether the imputable 
acts gave a clear picture of the type of anti-democratic society the 
party advocated.100  First, the Court indicated that the risk to democracy was 
sufficiently imminent in this case; there had been a considerable rise in the party's 
influence and a strong probability that it would become the ruling party.101  In the 
1995 general election, for example, RP obtained 22 percent of the votes and 
received 158 seats in parliament.102  In the 1996 local elections, the party obtained 
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35 percent of the votes; moreover, an opinion poll indicated that this percentage 
could have risen to 67 percent within a few years.103  
As for the second part of the ?necessary interference? analysis, the Court 
concluded that the views and speeches of Refah's members could be imputed to 
the organization as a whole.104  The statements and acts of the chairman "could 
incontestably be attributed to Refah" because he was the leader of his party, and 
he had never indicated that the party had opposing views.105  The same conclusion 
was reached in regard to the acts and speeches of party members because their 
views were never criticized by Refah.106  
Fin??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? test, the Court held 
that the acts and speeches of the party members set up a clear picture of the type 
of anti-democratic society the party pursued.107  The members advocated a 
plurality of legal systems that would categorize individuals based on their 
religious beliefs.108  Such a system would be incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights because such governance would infringe upon the 
principle of nondiscrimination, one of the fundamental principles of democracy, 
by treating individuals differently based on their religion.109  Moreover, a regime 
based on sharia would likewise be incompatible with the notion of democracy 
because it would create a system where religion would intervene in all spheres of 
public and where women would be treated unequally.110 
              In solidifying its conclusion, the Court indicated that the need to 
dissolve Refah Partisi was particularly urgent because "Refah did not exclude 
recourse to force in order to implement its policy".111  In addition, 
the sanction was proportionate to the constitutional violation because only five 
members lost their seats in parliament; the remaining 152 members continued to 
pursue their careers.112  Consequently, the dissolution of Refah Partisi and the 
forfeiture of certain political rights did not violate Article 11 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.113 
 
E . Refah Partisi : An Inconsistent and Unprecedented Outcome 
 
              Although the ECHR supported Turkey's decision to ban RP, this is the 
only political party dissolution case (with the Republic of Turkey as the 
respondent state) where the ECHR did not find a violation of Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.114  Thus, this unprecedented decision 
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does not indicate that Turkey's law on political parties is aligned with European 
standards, and consequently, the ease with which political parties can be banned 
will continue to inhibit Turkey's accession into the European Union.  However, it 
then becomes a matter of distinguishing this case from other dissolution 
cases.  From an outsider's prospective, it appears that the ECHR was alarmed 
by the party's willingness to use force to achieve a new form of 
governance incompatible with democracy.115  The Court stressed that a system of 
governance based on sharia law would be contrary to the principles of 
democracy.116   
In addition, it condemned the use of force to achieve a political 
objective.117  Although the Court strongly believes that democracy is incompatible 
with governance based on sharia law, it cannot be said that the holding would be 
the same had the party's members stressed a transition through peaceful 
means.  After all, the Court has stressed that "freedom of expression as enshrined 
in Article 10 is applicable . . . not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb."118  ?????? ??? ???? ???????? ????????????? ?????????
sharia law may appear to be utterly incompatible with the notion of democratic 
governance, political parties have a right to debate the preferred form of 
governance.   
Moreover, the Court has stressed that in considering whether to ban a 
party, an important factor to take into consideration is the party's willingness to 
resort to violence to achieve its political objectives.119  The ECHR has indicated 
that it "finds nothing in [the party's program] that can be considered a call for the 
use of violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic 
???????????? ?????? ??? ???? ??????? view is an essential factor to be taken into 
consideration."120  Consequently, it appears that the advocacy of a system of 
governance incompatible with democracy, coupled with the threat of violence to 
achieve that objective, is reprehensible enough to uphold the Constitutional 
Court's decision to ban RP. 
 
F . European Standards Regarding the Closure of Political Parties 
 
              Although Turkey has implemented several reforms to make it more 
difficult to dissolve 
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political parties, further reforms are necessary before its law will conform with 
European 
standards.  The Venice Commission, an advisory body of the Council of 
Europe, indicated that there are a number of common features, 
despite wide diversity, among European countries with regard to provisions 
governing political party activity.121  To begin, the authority to initiate a 
prohibition procedure is rarely entrusted with the prosecuting authorities.122  Such 
a decision should be discretionary, as initiating the procedure itself may have 
grave consequences (due to the sensitivity of cases restricting 
fundamental rights).123  Thus, in the countries with rules on party dissolution, 
the decision to initiate a proceeding is largely political.124  In Germany, for 
example, the decision lies with the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament, 
or the Federal Council.125  Because Turkey is unique in that competence lies with 
the Chief Public Prosecutor,126 the Commission believes that the procedural 
aspect of dissolution is not in line with European standards.127  By providing one 
individual with this authority, the entire procedure is left up to one man or 
?????????????????? discretion, without a democratic check or balance.128 
             The Commission also examined European standards regarding the criteria 
for prohibiting and dissolving political parties.129  It concluded that there 
are several national requirements, including, but not limited to, organizations that 
threaten the existence or sovereignty of the state or its basic democratic order; that 
foster social, ethnic, or religious hatred; that use or threaten to use violence; that 
are fascists or Nazis; and those that are criminal associations.130 
Although the national requirements vary depending on historical experience, the 
Commission indicated that no European system includes all of these criteria, 
and the majority of the systems includes only one or two.131  Turkey, however, 
lists eight criteria in Article 68 of the Constitution, some of which are listed in 
broad terms, leaving room for manipulation.132 
              Another broad distinction the Commission draws is the frequency with 
which dissolution is sought.  The Commission indicated, "in Turkey a high 
number of political parties have been prohibited over the years.  This [is in stark] 
contrast with the prevailing European approach, under which political parties are 
prohibited or dissolved only in exceptional cases."133  In Europe, there have been 
                                                 
121Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of Political 
Parties in Turkey, EUR. COMM?N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM?N), No. 
489/2008 of 13 Mar. 2008, ¶ 15 [hereinafter Opinion]. 
122Id. ¶ 33. 
123Id. 
124Id. ¶ 34. 
125Id. 
126T???????C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 69 (Turk.). 
127See Opinion, supra note 121, ¶ 35. 
128Id. ¶¶ 35, 86 
129Id. ¶¶ 23-30. 
130Id. ¶ 23. 
131Id. ¶ 25. 
132Id. ¶¶ 73-74;T?????? C???????????ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] Nov. 7, 1982, art. 68 (Turk.). 
133Opinion, supra note 121, ¶ 3. 
N o .  1          ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?              1 5  
 
few dissolutions, and each concerned marginal and extremist parties in Germany 
and Spain.134  Thus, outside Turkey, this remedy is utilized only in exceptional 
circumstances.  In the Commission's view, a remedy as extreme as dissolution 
should be used only when there is a threat of or use of violence.135  Although this 
standard is somewhat stricter than that in most European countries, the ECHR 
seems to support this view, upholding dissolution in Refah Partisi because of the 
threat of violence to instill an undemocratic regime.136 
 
G . Conclusions on Political Party Closure in Turkey 
 
              It is unlikely that Turkey will become a member of the European Union 
in the foreseeable future because of the dissimilarities that exist between its 
political party dissolution laws and that of other European nations.  For Turkey to 
complete its accession negotiations, it will need to align its laws with those of the 
European Union in thirty-five subject-related chapters.137  Because political 
parties are essential to effective democratic governance, Turkey will likely 
experience difficulty in completing the "judiciary and fundamental rights" 
chapter.138  Although there is a permitted margin of appreciation (a doctrine the 
court uses to take into consideration that the Convention may be interpreted 
differently in each member state), because of the diversity among European 
nations, Turkey's law appears to be too distinct, and thus, incapable of 
reconciliation with the European standard.  Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
European Commission will open, let alone close ???? ???????? ??? ??????????? ????
????????????????????????????????????????? reformed. 
              The European decision-making bodies unanimously agree that Turkey 
needs to reform its law.  The European Commission has stressed that Turkey 
needs to bring its political party closure law in line with European 
standards.139  The Venice Commission similarly concluded that Turkey's political 
party "reforms have not been sufficient to fully bridge the gap between the 
Turkish rules and the standards of the ECHR and the Venice 
Commission."140  Because of the consensus of opinion among the international 
community, Turkey will need to narrow the gap between its law and those of other 
European countries before it will be admitted into the European Union. 
 
I I. F reedom of Religion in Turkey 
 
A. The Law 
 
              Although Turkey's law regarding freedom of religion is more in line with 
European standards than its law regarding the dissolution of political parties, the 
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European Commission continues to pressure Turkey to uphold its constitutional 
protections.141  The Turkish Constitution provides that "[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.  Acts of worship, religious 
services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that they do not 
violate the provisions of Article 14."142  Article 14 further provides that the rights 
and freedoms provided for in the Constitution shall not "be exercised with the aim 
of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and 
endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish 
Republic based upon human rights."143  Although Article 14 seems 
to diminish freedom of religion, this limitation is consistent with European 
standards because its objective is to impose limitations on individual rights and 
freedoms when necessary to protect the interests of society as a whole.144 
 
B. Case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey 
 
              Turkey's law on freedom of religion is inconsistent with European 
standards regarding compulsory religious education in primary and 
secondary schools.145  Turkey's Constitution provides that "[i]nstruction in 
religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of 
primary and secondary schools.  Other religious education and instruction shall be 
subject to the individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of 
their legal representatives."146  
Because of this law, Hasan Zengin and his daughter, Eylem Zengin, 
submitted a request to the Provincial Directorate of National Education seeking an 
exemption from the religious culture and ethics courses.147  The Zengins were 
adherents to Alevism, a branch of Islam that differs from Sunni Islam in many 
aspects.  For example, adherents to Alevism reject the sharia law, defend women's 
rights, and express their devotion through song and dance instead of attending a 
mosque.  The Zengins felt that their family should be exempt from religious 
courses because the compulsory nature of the education was contrary to 
secularism.148  Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights allows 
parents to choose the type of education their children receive.149  Their exemption 
request was denied because the Turkish Constitution expressly provides for 
compulsory religious education in primary and secondary schools.150 
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              Following this denial, the applicants brought their claims to the ECHR, 
alleging a violation of Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.151  Similar to the Universal Declaration, Article 2 provides that a 
state must respect parents' rights to ensure their children receive education in 
accordance with their religious beliefs.152  In response to this allegation, the 
ECHR noted that its case law indicates that the objective of Article 2 is to ensure 
pluralism in education, an essential characteristic for democratic 
governance.153  Thus, although the court acknowledged that educational 
curricula falls within the competence of state parties, a state may not "pursue an 
aim of indoctrination" that could be perceived as disregarding parents' religious 
beliefs.154  It explained that a democratic society has an obligation to be impartial 
and neutral towards various religious beliefs to ensure pluralism.155 
              In order to decide whether the curriculum is taught objectively, the 
ECHR looked to the religious course syllabus and textbooks.  According to the 
syllabus, the subject matter was to be taught in accordance with the principles of 
seculari??? ???? ??? ?????? ??????????? ???????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????? ??? a context of 
???????????156  Thus, these objectives were compatible with the principles 
????????????? ??????????? ?? ???????? ??????????? ????? ????157  However, the Court 
went on to note that the syllabus provided for instruction on the Koran and 
Mohamed; likewise, the seventh grade syllabus provided for instruction on 
several fundamental aspects of Islam.158  The issue became more problematic 
after the ECHR examined the textbooks used by the Turkish government in 
primary and secondary education.  These textbooks did not provide a general 
overview of the world religions; rather, they "provide[d] instruction in the major 
principles of the Muslim faith . . . such as the profession of faith, the five daily 
prayers, Ramadan, [and] pilgrimage."159  In addition, students must take exams on 
the Koran and the daily prayers.160  The ECHR went on to conclude that although 
Turkey gives priority to the Islamic faith, it is the majority religion in the country, 
and thus, Islam-focused religious instruction alone cannot be viewed as 
indoctrination.161 
              This, however, was not the end of the analysis:  the ECHR considered the 
allegation that no instruction was provided on the Alevi faith.162  It noted that a 
large portion of the Turkish population adheres to Alevism.163  Thus, because 
Alevism was not taught and religious instruction was heavily focused on Sunni 
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Islam,164 Turkey's curriculum did not meet Article 2's requirement of objectivity 
as required by the case law.  Finally, the ECHR decided whether Turkey's law 
respects parents' religious views.165  If the law allows children to be exempted 
from religious courses, the Sunni Islam-heavy curriculum would be permitted (in 
light of the fact that 99 percent of the Turkish population adheres to the Muslim 
faith) as long as it became more objective.166  In 1990, Turkey's Supreme Council 
for Education indicated that children who adhere to the Jewish or Christian faith 
could apply for an exemption.167  The Court concluded that this exemption 
procedure did not provide sufficient guarantees to concerned parents.168  
Requiring students to reveal their religious affiliation to apply for an 
exemption poses a problem under both the Turkish Constitution and Article 9 of 
the Convention.169  Moreover, by disallowing the possibility of exemption to 
the Muslim faith, the government was indirectly acknowledging that Islam 
heavily influenced the curriculum.170  Lastly, because the decision to exempt was 
discretionary, there were no obligatory safeguards for parents who have religious 
beliefs different from those taught.171 
 
C . Conclusions on Compulsory Religious Education in Turkey 
 
              Turkey's failure to change its practice regarding compulsory religious 
education will likely hamper the country's accession into the European 
Union.  Unlike Turkey, almost all European states allow students to opt out of 
compulsory religious courses or make attendance optional.172  Thus, 
Turkey will have difficulty concluding negotiations on chapter twenty-three?
judiciary and fundamental rights?until it can adequately protect religious 
freedom, a hallmark of modern-day democracies.173  Moreover, negotiations on 
this chapter have yet to be opened; thirteen out of thirty-five chapters have been 
opened (one has been closed), but chapter twenty-three remains untouched.174  In 
addition to the lack of progress over the last six-and-a-half years,175 the European 
Commission continues to criticize Turkey for its failure to implement 
the Zengin decision.  In its 2010 report, the Commission indicated that Turkey had 
not yet implemented the Zengin judgment, which requested Turkey to conform to 
Article 2 after finding that classes did not give a general overview of world 
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?????????? ???? ?????????? ????????? ?????????on in the guiding principles of the 
Muslim faith."176  This disfavor carried over to the 2011 progress report; the 
ECHR indicated that although the Ministry of National Education prepared new 
textbooks that will include information on Alevism, religious courses remain 
compulsory under Turkish law.177  Furthermore, the Commission pointed out that 
the Zengin decision remains unimplemented, exemptions are rare, alternative 
classes are not provided for exempted students, and there have been reports that 
students who do not attend religious courses receive lower grades.178 
 
D . Sahin v. Turkey: the Headscarf Case 
 
              As with Refah Partisi, Sahin demonstrates the European Court of Human 
Rights' willingness to consider Turkey's unique religious atmosphere when 
determining how far to allow it to stray from European standards.  The 
circumstances of the headscarf case are as follows.  Leyla Sahin was a fifth-
year medical student studying at the Cerrahpasa Faculty of Medicine at Istanbul 
University.179  She completed her first four years at the Faculty of Medicine at 
Bursa University and wore the Islamic headscarf daily.180  However, during 
her time at Istanbul University, the university issued a circular that required 
faculty to prohibit students wearing the Islamic headscarf from attending lectures, 
tutorials, and courses.181  In accordance with this circular, Ms. Sahin was denied 
access to an examination and lecture and was also prohibited from enrolling in 
classes for the following semester.182  Despite warnings, Ms. Sahin continued 
to wear her headscarf and was consequently suspended for a semester after taking 
part in a protest against the school dress code.183  She tried unsuccessfully to get 
the administration to annul the circular;184 she then left the school to continue her 
studies at Vienna University.185 
              Ms. Sahin took her case to the European Court of Human Rights, 
arguing "that the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher 
education constituted an unjustified interference with her right to freedom of 
religion, in particular, her right to manifest her religion."186  The court began with 
the premise that the circular interfered with the applicant's right to manifest her 
religion in a particular place, a university.187  In deciding whether the interference 
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was prescribed by law, the court reiterated its case-law, indicating that the term 
"prescribed by law" means a basis in domestic law that is both accessible and 
understandable in a way that would allow the individual to foresee the 
consequences of a given action.188  Thus, in contending that the restriction was 
not prescribed by law, Ms. Sahin argued that the law was inconsistent, and 
therefore, the consequences of an action were unforeseeable because the circular 
was incompatible with Section 17 of Law Number 2547.  Section 17 provides, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? that it 
does not ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ???????189  The Court held 
that "law" includes statutory law and case law, and a year after Section 17 of Law 
Number 2547 was enacted, the Constitutional Court of Turkey indicated that 
authorizing women to wear headscarves in universities is contrary to the notion of 
secularism.190 This decision was binding and published in the Official Gazette.191  
Moreover, the school adopted memorandums and resolutions well before the 
applicant enrolled there;192 these documents indicated that the Constitutional 
Court ruled that religious attire may not be worn in universities.193  Thus, it should 
have been clear to Ms. Sahin that she would be refused access to classes and 
examinations if she did not remove her headscarf.194 
 In deciding whether the restriction sought to pursue a legitimate aim, the 
court stated that the restriction was implemented to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others and to protect public order.195  The Court did not elaborate on 
this point, but the Court appears to agree with Turkey's proposition that 
prohibiting the headscarf prevents the state from favoring one religion over 
another.196  Finally, the Court was left to decide whether this restriction was 
necessary in a democratic society.197  The Court stated, "[i]n democratic 
societies . . . it may be necessary to restrict freedoms to manifest one's religion or 
belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that 
everyone's beliefs are respected."198  It is important that the state 
demonstrates mutual tolerance for all religious beliefs, and thus remains 
impartial.199  In addition, because there is currently no uniform standard in Europe 
regarding the significance of religion in society or the proper relationship between 
religion and the state, permitted limitations are decided on a case-by-case 
basis.200  Thus, states are allowed a margin of appreciation in deciding what 
measures to implement.201  Through this reasoning, the limitations were upheld in 
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this case.  The Court emphasized that because the majority of the population is 
Muslim, and the headscarf is seen as a compulsory religious obligation, students 
who choose not to wear it may be deprived of their free will upon seeing others 
who comply with this religious duty.202  Similarly, prohibiting the headscarf 
prevents the state from manifesting a preference for a particular religious belief, 
which is an important notion in Turkey because of its long-standing struggle to 
separate religion from the political discourse.203 
              Lastly, the Court had to decide whether the means pursued to achieve the 
objective were proportional.204  It held this condition was satisfied because 
practicing Muslims are free to manifest their religion outside the university 
environment.205  In addition, headscarves are not the only religious symbol 
prohibited in universities; other religious attire is similarly banned.206  
Consequently, there was no breach of Article 9 of the Convention, which protects 
an individual's right to manifest his or her religious beliefs.207 
 
E . Sahin v. Turkey: Another Refah Partisi? 
 
               Because of the utmost importance of freedom of religion in democratic 
societies, it is surprising that the European Court of Human Rights upheld 
Turkey's decision to ban the headscarf on university campuses.  The 
distinguishing factor in this case appears to be the permitted margin of 
appreciation when it comes to limiting freedom of religion.208  In Europe, there is 
no consensus on the proper relationship between the church and the state, and 
there is wide diversity in the degree to which headscarves are regulated.209  In 
France, for example, the notion of secularism is incorporated into the 
Constitution, and French law prohibits students in state primary and secondary 
schools from wearing religious attire that "overtly manifest[s] a religious 
affiliation."210  On the other hand, students are permitted to wear the headscarf in 
countries such as Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom.211  The Netherlands goes a step further and permits 
teachers to wear the headscarf.212 
              Because member states' laws vary on the permissibility of wearing 
headscarves in the school environment, the willingness of the court to 
restrict freedom to manifest one's religious beliefs is fathomable.  
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The European Court of Human Rights is not merely a state court that upholds 
state notions of religious freedom, but it is also a supranational court that must 
look to the standards in various countries when creating its case law.  When there 
is not a uniform view on a particular issue, it appears the ECHR is willing to give 
the respondent state a margin of appreciation in deciding what policies are 
appropriate to protect the rights of society as a whole.  The Court also appears to 
respect the notion of state sovereignty until there is a clear consensus on the 
ability of states to regulate religious attire. 
 
F. Arslan v. Turkey: Imposing Limits on Sahin v. Turkey 
 
              Arslan v. Turkey demonstrates that the European Court of Human Rights 
is unwilling to permit states to stray too far from the rights guaranteed in Article 9 
of the Convention.  In this case, Mr. Ahmet Arslan and 126 Turkish nationals 
belonged to Aczimendi tarikaty, a religious group.213  In October 1996, they met 
for a religious ceremony.  Afterwards, they toured the Ankara streets "while 
wearing the distinctive dress of their group, which . . . was made up of a turban, 
'salvar' (baggy 'harem' trousers), a tunic and a stick."214  They were arrested 
and convicted of violating laws that prohibit headgear and religious attire from 
being worn in public other than for religious ceremonies.215  Because of these 
convictions, Mr. Ahmet Arslan and the other Turkish nationals petitioned the 
European Court of Human Rights claiming that the convictions violated Article 9 
of the Convention.216 
              In determining whether there was a violation of Article 9, the Court held 
that there was an interference with the right to manifest one's religion.217  It also 
held that the interference was prescribed by law and "pursued the legitimate aims 
of protection of public safety, prevention of disorder and protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others."218  However, Turkey was unable to establish the 
necessity of this interference in a democratic society.219  The applicants were 
punished solely for wearing religious attire in a public place.220  Moreover, there 
was no evidence that the group constituted a threat to public order or sought to 
exert their religious views on others.221  In addition, the applicants did not hold an 
official status, and thus, laws concerning civil servants 
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were inapplicable.222  Finally, as opposed to other cases where freedom to 
manifest one's religion was subject to restrictions, these individuals were not 
convicted of wearing religious attire in a public establishment where religious 
neutrality might trump the freedoms laid out in Article 9.223  For these reasons, six 
of the seven judges voted that the convictions violated Article 9.224 
 
Conclusion 
 
              It is unlikely that Turkey will become a member of the European Union 
in the foreseeable future because it is unwilling to effectively protect freedom of 
association and freedom of religion.  In regards to the dissolution of political 
parties, both the European Commission and the Venice Commission agree that 
significant constitutional reform is needed to align Turkey's law with European 
standards.225  Although several European countries have guidelines that provide 
for dissolution in exceptional circumstances, these laws are rarely 
effectuated.226  Specifically, the Venice Commission noted that outside 
Turkey, dissolution laws were implemented solely to ban marginal and extremist 
parties in Germany and Spain.227  Thus, because the international community 
condemns the excessive manner in which Turkey has utilized its dissolution law, 
it is unlikely that the European Commission will open, let alone close the 
"judiciary and fundamental rights" chapter.228  The particular importance of 
political parties "in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy" 
strengthens this conclusion.229 
Additionally, Turkey's failure to adequately protect freedom of religion 
will equally prevent negotiations on the "judiciary and fundamental 
rights" chapter.230  In regards to compulsory religious education, the European 
Commission continues to condemn Turkey for its failure to implement 
the Zengin decision.231  This denouncement stems from Turkey's digression from 
the European standard: almost all European countries permit students to opt out 
of religious education or make attendance optional.232  Furthermore, Turkey is too 
willing to restrict freedom to manifest one's religious beliefs.  Although the 
European Court of Human Rights upheld Turkey's decision in Sahin v. 
Turkey,233 this departure from its past holdings appears to be the result of the 
permitted margin of appreciation when it comes to limiting freedom of 
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religion.234  In Europe, there is no consensus on the proper relationship between 
the church and the state, and there is also wide diversity in the degree to which 
countries regulate headscarf wear.235  However, the ECHR was unwilling to allow 
Turkey to stray too far from freedom to manifest one's religion: the court 
denounced Turkey's decision to impose sanctions on individuals who 
wore religious attire in a public area.236  Thus, overall, the ECHR appears to 
believe that Turkey's law needs to be aligned with European standards. 
Consequently, it is unlikely Turkey will gain admission to the European 
Union until it can adequately protect religious freedom, a hallmark of modern-day 
democracies.237 
It is also unlikely that Turkey will gain admission to the EU because 
accession requires a unanimous vote by all members of the European 
Union.238  Thus, even if this chapter is eventually closed, achieving a unanimous 
vote in favor of accession is improbable because several countries, notably France 
and Germany, adamantly oppose Turkish accession.239  Until Turkey can persuade 
the union that it belongs among the European countries and that it is capable of 
reforming its laws to meet European standards, Turkey will remain outside this 
supranational organization. 
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